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Increasing numbers of personal computers are
now shipped with an integrated smart card, called
the trusted platform module (TPM). This module
is designed to carry specific data related to the
platform and to provide the software running on
the computer with this information. Since this
technology is very similar to a generic smart card,
it could also be used in e-commerce to attempt to
link the use of a particular computer to a
particular transaction effected over the internet.
The potential of the TPM is discussed in this
article, and consideration is given as to whether a
TPM could be used to carry information related to
the purported user. The authors also examine
whether the TPM can be used as a secure
signature creation device that conforms to the EU
Electronic Signature Directive as well as to the
German Electronic Signature Law.
Introduction 
A qualified electronic signature that confirms to article
5(1) of the EU Electronic Signature Directive2 (EU
Directive) and § 2(3) of the Signature Act 2001 (SigG) is
an advanced signature as specified by article 2(2) of the
EU Directive and § 2(2) of SigG, which is based on a
qualified certificate and which is created by a secure
signature creation device. These signatures may be
considered to be a component for e-commerce
transactions in the future, since they are capable of
linking a particular computer to a particular transaction
effected over the internet. Digital signatures are not
widely used, and it is asserted that the failure to use
digital signatures thereby deprives the market for
electronic commerce of an important source of potential
growth.3 Users generally do not use smart cards for the
purpose of using an advanced signature. A promising
approach to overcome this shortcoming is to use an
additional hardware module called the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) to create an advanced signature. The
TPM is already available in more than 60 million
personal computers.4 This technology is supported by
many hardware vendors and is therefore widespread.5
One of the properties required of this chip is to perform
the necessary cryptographic functions to create an
advanced signature. However, the ability to perform the
required mathematical operations is not enough to use
this device to create an advanced signature. This is due
to the requirements for a compliant device for the
creation of an advanced signature, as set out in article
5(1) and Annex I – III of the EU Directive and the
Signature Act 2001.
This article considers whether the TPM can be used to
create qualified electronic signatures, and if so, whether
such signatures could be used in e-commerce. The
potential risks and defences relating to the threats in e-
commerce are set out before demonstrating how the
trusted platform module works. Thereafter, the article
considers whether the TPM fulfills the technological
requirements of article 5(1) of the EU Directive and §
2(3) SigG, together with the criteria provided for in
Annex III of the EU Directive and § 17 Abs. 1 SigG, as
well as § 15 Signature Decree 2001 (SigVO).
Perceived problem 
In contrast to the physical world, where goods may be
directly exchanged for currency, when selling goods or
services at a distance, such as over the internet,
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payment is not made at the same time the goods or
services are provided, in the same way as buying and
selling through a catalogue by mail order. The seller
needs to be assured that they will be paid, and the
buyer wants to be reassured that they will receive the
goods or services in exchange for authorizing payment.
In the on-line environment, an e-mail address and the
use of a password is usually necessary to identify the
parties to the transaction. Both items of information can
be obtained very easily through the use of malicious
software, such as a Trojan horse, keylogger, or by social
engineering (phishing). Furthermore, these forms of
attack cannot be prevented by using Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
cryptographic protocols, since the attacks are made at
the end of the communication channel, where
confidential data is available in plaintext. This is one
reason why many customers perceive there is a high
danger that their data may be misused. As a result of
these attacks, it can be difficult to prove that an
agreement was concluded,6 which might make it
difficult for a vendor to enforce a contract.7
In general, vendors identify their customers based on
e-mail addresses. An e-mail address can be generated
by using false or fictional names. This means vendors
that fail to use any other form of verification are at a
high risk of being subject to attempts at fraud. It is
argued that by identifying both parties to a transaction
based on qualified signatures, trust in transaction
processes can be improved. Qualified signatures require
the use of a smart card. However, smart cards are not
widely used for this purpose. The trusted platform
module specified by the trusted computing group
provides similar functionalities to a smart card. The
difference is, that this technology is already widespread
and can be used now. It is therefore necessary to
determine whether the TPM could be used as secure
signature creation device.
Technical background
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a non-profit
organization formed to develop, define, and promote
open standards for hardware-enabled trusted
computing and security technologies, including
hardware building blocks and software interfaces,
across multiple platforms, peripherals and devices. The
core of the specifications provided by the TCG is the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM),8 which is basically a
smart card soldered on the mainboard of a personal
computer. Similar to a smart card, the TPM offers the
following functionalities: the generation of asymmetric
and symmetric keys with the hardware based physical
random number generator; signature creation, hash
value creation and asymmetric encryption; the provision
of hardware protected storage; the provision of a
trusted counter for the validation of certificates and
platform integrity measurement and integrity reporting.
Before shipping a personal computer containing a
TPM, the TPM is disabled. Before the TPM can be used,
it must be initiated by executing the Take_Ownership
command. This command must be carried out by a user,
who also has to enter a password, named the owner-
password. This owner-password is used to generate the
storage-root-key (SRK), which protects other keys by
encrypting them. The SRK is stored in the non-volatile
storage of the TPM and it is only possible to obtain
access to this key by entering the correct password.
Obtaining access to the TPM-generated keys is
therefore only possible if the SRK has not been altered
and the user enters the correct password. To enter this
password, it is necessary to obtain access to the
functions provided by the trusted platform module. If
the password has been lost, the user cannot obtain
access to the keys stored in the module. However, by
using the physical-presence9 command of the TPM, a
new password can be created. Since this process
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transaction based on qualified signatures, trust in
transaction processes can be improved. 
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deletes the previous SRK, it is not possible to obtain
access to data that has been encrypted with the
previous SRK.
Since the creation and storing of keys are critical
operations, it is important that these functions are
reliably enforced and compatible to the specification.
The specification therefore requires that all TPM
products be certified by the international common
criteria standard.10 The current TPM specification 1.2
demands a certification according to evaluation
assurance level 4 (EAL 4).
The TPM chip has the functionality to create its own
signature keys with the help of the physical random
number generator. The private portion of the generated
key is then encrypted with the SRK, which is stored in
the non-volatile storage of the TPM. The generated keys
can be 2048 bit long and are based on the P1363
standard,11 which uses RSA as the signature scheme.
The TPM possesses its own RSA engine, which is used
for signature creation and asymmetric key operations.
This engine can create signatures based on the PKCS#1
standard.12 Additionally, the TPM uses SHA-1 as defined
in FIPS-180-113 for secure hashing. It should be noted
that recently discovered weaknesses14 in the used SHA-1
hash function, specified as the used hash-function by
the TCG, could possibly facilitate attacks. An adversary
might therefore exploit this vulnerability to forge a
correct signature.
The TPM specification requires that all TPM products
be certified according to FIPS 140-2, which defines the
security requirements for cryptographic modules. A TPM
that conforms to the specification is therefore tamper-
evident, but not tamper-resistant.15 It has no
countermeasures against the unauthorized extractions
of secret keys. However, many TPM vendors offer higher
protection mechanisms for stored keys. This is because
the TPM is, in essence, a smart card, and the vendors
extend their own smart card cores to fit the TPM
specification. This is, for example, the case with the
Infineon SLE 66 C product family16 and the ST
Microelectronics ST19W family.17 The underlying smart
card core possesses extensive preventive measures
against unauthorized extractions of keys, such as light
sensors or active shields to detect an attack. These
products meet the EAL5+ certification, as well as the
tamper-resistance without difficulty.
Testing SigG conformity
In order to create a qualified electronic signature, the
signature must pass the requirements specified in
article 5(1) of the EU Directive and § 2 No. 3 SigG.
According to these provisions, the signature must be
created with a secure signature creation device. The
detailed requirements are defined in annex III of the EU
Directive and for Germany in § 17(1) SigG and § 15(1)
and (5) SigVO. According to the provisions of annex
1(I)(1) of SigVO, the secure signature creation device
must fulfill the assurance level EAL 4 and be tested
against an attacker with a high attack potential
(strength of function high). As already shown, this
requirement is not covered by the TPM specification, but
can be fulfilled by the TPM products.
According to the provisions of annex III(1)(b) of the EU
Directive and to § 17 (1) SigG, the signature creation
device must reliably detect a potential forgery or a
modification of the signature. Annex III of the EU
Directive provides as follows:
Requirements for secure signature-creation devices
1. Secure signature-creation devices must, by
appropriate technical and procedural means, ensure
at the least that:
(a) the signature-creation-data used for signature
generation can practically occur only once, and that
their secrecy is reasonably assured;
(b) the signature-creation-data used for signature
generation cannot, with reasonable assurance, be
derived and the signature is protected against
forgery using currently available technology;
(c) the signature-creation-data used for signature
generation can be reliably protected by the
legitimate signatory against the use of others.
A forgery or a modification of a signature is recognizable
if the verification mechanism of a digital signature
cannot be bypassed or deactivated.18 Forging a
10 The Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
11 IEEE P1363: Standard Specifications For Public-Key
Cryptography, available on-line at
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/.
12 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 RFC 3447,
available on-line at
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447, 2003.
13 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 140-2: Security Requirements for
Cryptographic. Modules, available on-line at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-
2/fips1402.pdf, 2002.
14 Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu,
‘Finding collisions in the full SHA-1,’ In Advances
in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005, Springer, Volume
3621, 2005, 17–36.
15 Oliver Kömmerling and Markus Kuhn, ‘Design
Principles for Tamper-Resistant Smartcard
Processors’, Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop
on Smartcard Technology, Chicago, 10-11 Mai,
1999.
16 Infineon Technologies AG, Product Brief Security &
Chip Card ICs SLE 66C42P, 2002.
17 STMicroelectronics, Product Brief,  ST19WL34
Smartcard MCU with MAP, 2004, available on-line
at http://www.st.com/stonline/products
/literature/bd/10928/st19wp18-tpm-c.pdf.
18 Bundesrats-Drucksache. 966/96, 36f.
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signature is not detectable if an unauthorized person
can obtain access to the signature key. This situation
could occur in the following cases:
• The same signature pair is generated multiple
times.19
• The private key used for signature creation can be
obtained through the public key.20
• The private key can be guessed.21
• The private key is copied during generation and
transferred to another unauthorized person.22
• The private key is accessible or useable in a stolen or
found signature creation device.23
The TPM uses a physical random number generator for
key generation, which causes the distribution of all keys
to have an equal probability. In combination with keys
consisting of 2048 bit, every key is unique with
sufficient probability. The key length used by the TPM is
appropriate for signature keys until 201124 with respect
to the implemented hash function, which is, despite the
SHA-1 weakness, applicable until 2009. The key length
means it is almost impossible to guess the private key,
and the RSA algorithm provides assurance that the
private key cannot be computed based on the public
key. The requirement that the keys must not be revealed
according to § 15(1)(2) SigVO (tamper-resistance) is not
fulfilled by the TPM specification. However, it is
suggested that the TPM products meet that
requirement. The TPM also protects the signature key
against the use by others through the owner-password,
therefore fulfilling requirement (c) of the EU Directive.
The method of generating a secure owner-password is
discussed in the following section.
The TPM specification meets the basic requirements
of annex III of the EU Directive, but does not meet all
formal requirements of the Signature Act 2001. The
available products fulfill all requirements of the German
signature law from the technical perspective. Therefore,
these products can be validated according to annex 1 of
the SigVO25 and approved as secure signature creation
devices.
Qualified Electronic Signature
As already described in the preceding section, the TPM
provides the functions to create an advanced signature.
Since the TPM was originally designed to carry platform-
specific data and information about the user, it must be
determined whether it can also be used for this
purpose.
Identification
The basic difference between the smart card with the
ability to create an advanced signature and the TPM, is
that a smart card is directly bound to a certain user,
while the TPM is shipped without personal certificates.
In order to use the TPM to carry information relating to
the user, it is therefore necessary that a certification
service provider (CSP) identifies the owner of a TPM and
certifies the corresponding public signature key. The
applicant for a qualified certificate must therefore,
according to the provisions of annex II(d) of the EU
Directive and § 5 (1)(1) SigG, be clearly identified by the
CSP, for example, by validating their identification card,
if such a form of identification is acceptable. The user
can physically visit the CSP for this purpose, or a third
party may, in accordance with the provisions of § 4(5)
SigG, validate the identity of the user. The German
PostIdent method run by the German Post AG may be a
useful method to use for this purpose. This method is
still used by many on-line credit institutes to identify
their customers according to the provisions of § 154 Tax
Law. The identification can therefore be accomplished in
the post office or at the applicant’s home. After the
identification process is complete, the applicant
receives a unique code, which is used to assign the
signature key to a person. This code must be transferred
over secure channels to the applicant. This can be
achieved by certified mail or physically handed over to
the applicant in person.
Issuing Qualified Certificates
In Germany, there are additional requirements to be
fulfilled when issuing a qualified signature, although
similar problems exist under the terms of the EU
Directive which are described in article 2(10) of the EU
Directive. According to §§ 5(6) and § 15(7)(2) SigG, the
certification service provider must ensure that the
applicant that wishes to obtain a signature is in
possession of a secure signature creation device - in this
case, the TPM. Qualitatively, both requirements of §§
5(6) and § 15(7)(2) SigG are identical. For this purpose,
a protocol is introduced, illustrated in Figure 1, that
fulfils the requirement of proving the possession of a
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secure signature creation device, and also ensures that
the keys are placed into this specific device.
One requirement for the success of this scheme is
that the CSP offers a platform that enables secure
communication between applicant and the CSP, by
using the Transport Layer Security. In this context, it is
necessary for the CSP to authenticate itself against the
applicant.26 This is essential, because it is possible that
a false person masquerading as the legitimate CSP may
present the applicant with what seems like a legitimate
certificate to authenticate themselves. Figure 1 shows
the CSP and the platform of A (the applicant). The
applicant’s platform A is split into two components: the
TPM, which caries out the cryptographic functions, and
the software, which is provided by the CSP.
After the applicant (A) has entered their personal
data, they transfer their identification code to the CSP
using the certificate issuing software (steps 1 - 3). In the
next step, the TPM of A generates a signature key pair
SKpriv and SKpub using the physical random number
generator of the TPM. In accordance with the provisions
of § 17(1)(3), this key can be generated on a secure
signature creation device - namely the TPM, and does
not need to be added externally.27 This also acts as a
26 The applicant must use special software that
implements the protocol described in figure 1. This
software should validate the certificate and cancel
the connection if the certificate is not valid.
27 Alexander Roßnagel,  Multimedia und Recht
(MMR) 2006, pp 441 (11.07.2006).
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issue a certificate
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form of self-protection, since this guarantees that the
key is protected over its lifetime and is not exposed to
third parties. After the private key pair is generated, it is
then encrypted with the SRK (step 6 in Figure 1) of the
TPM and returned to the user (7). The public part of the
signature-key is signed with a so-called identity key (IK)
of the TPM (9). This certification proves that the
corresponding key-pair is held in the protected storage
of a valid TPM and that the signed key is a key that
cannot be moved.28 Identity keys can only sign data that
originates from the TPM. Thus, a valid signature of data
proves that the data was generated on a TPM and is
protected by the TPM’s secure storage, in that it is part
of the key-hierarchy of the SRK. The identity key is only
valid if the TPM has not been tampered with and the
TPM is authentic. The IK is an asymmetric key that is
generated by a specific TPM key inserted by the vendor.
This process takes place before the actual signing key is
generated and involves an additional privacy
certification authority (CA), which verifies the vendors
key and then issues a certificate (CertIK) that belongs to
the IK.29 In the next step (10 and 11), the TPM transfers
the certificate of the signature key (CertSK) and the
certificate of the identity key (CertIK) to the CSP. The CSP
then verifies the authenticity of the signatures and
verifies whether IK is a valid identity key (12 and 13). If
the verification succeeds, the CSP has confirmation that
SKpriv is held in the protected storage of a genuine TPM.
Afterwards, the CSP signs the public part of the
signature key and issues the corresponding certificate
(14), which it adds to his own directory service. This
certificate is then transferred to the applicant. Finally, in
step 16, the CSP verifies whether the applicant has
access to the signature key by requesting a test
signature (proof of possession). To create a successful
signature, the TPM must decrypt the encrypted private
SK key. This is only possible if the correct SRK is stored
inside the protected storage of the TPM, and the owner
has delivered the correct password for decrypting the
SRK.
This kind of sample signature also fulfills the control
duties of the CSP. Since the applicant must perform a
sample signature, it is guaranteed that the applicant
possesses the required knowledge (password) for a
signature creation and that this unit is under the control
of the person using the password.
Trustworthy initializing software
It is necessary to use an initializing software that
reliably enforces the protocol set out above. This
software is also responsible for supporting the user
during the creation of a secure password. In contrast to
smart cards, which often include the use of a counter to
prevent more than a set number of attempts to correctly
guess the password, the TPM does not provide such a
function. The TPM specification requires a mechanism
that prevents dictionary attacks, but the specification is
not specific on this point, and leaves this to the TPM
vendor. As a result, different products exist which differ
in their implementation. For example, the STM TPM chip
provides a counter to prevent more than a set number of
attempts to correctly guess the password. In contrast to
smart cards, which prevent further use of the card after
several incorrectly entered passwords, the STM TPM
chip only increases the reaction time after 15 false
attempts.
The generation of a secure password should take
place before a signature-key is generated, to ensure
that the signature-key is protected by a secure
password and to prevent the use of a chip containing an
insecure password. The initialization process is
important, which means the trustworthiness of the
software must be guaranteed. This could, for example,
be performed by a boot CD that has been extended by
the functions set out above. This software is configured
so that it only supports connections to a specific CSP
and prevents remote access to the underlying hardware
TPM. The CSP must also validate whether the software
used for the acceptance of the initial signature reliably
enforces this requirement, because it is possible for the
applicant to place their signature key into a TPM, which
they can only obtain access to remotely. To ensure that a
human being has physical access to the TPM, the CSP
uses the integrity measurement and reporting
functionality provided by the TPM. The initialization
software is pre-configured in such a way that the TPM
measures all running software components and attests
this system state to the CSP. The CSP can then decide
via remote attestation30 whether a trustworthy
initialization software is used. If this verification is
successful and the protocol shown in figure 1 has been
executed, the CSP issues the corresponding certificate
and signs the applicant’s public key.
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29 For more details please refer to the TCG TPM Main
specification.
30 Frederic Stumpf, Omid Tafreschi, Patrick Röder and
Claudia Eckert, ‘A Robust Integrity Reporting
Protocol for Remote Attestation’, Proceedings of
the 2nd Workshop on Advances in Trusted
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Knowledge and possession
As described in the preceding sections, the TPM offers
the possibility to store and use personal certificates.
But it must still be determined whether the signatory is
also in in direct possession of a secure signature
creation device, and how this fact can be proven to the
CSP.31 The EU Directive requires, pursuant to annex III
(1)(c), that the signature key can be reliably protected
by the legitimate signatory against the use of others.
The provisions of § 15(1) SigVO state, in more detail,
that it should only be possible to obtain access to
signature keys after the identification of the applicant
on the basis of knowledge and possession, or by means
of a measurement of a biometric attribute. Since
biometric attributes do not provide the same level
regarding security, knowledge and possession must be
used as the means of identification. The requirement
that it should only be possible to obtain access to the
signature key if the applicant is successfully identified
on the basis of knowledge and possession, provides a
reasonable level of assurance that the signature was
created by a specific person. Since neither knowledge
nor possession on its own are reliable attributes to
identify somebody fully, both attributes must exist
simultaneously. Only when both attributes are used
together, it is argued, can an electronic signature
replace a manuscript signature and therefore act as
prima facie evidence in trial.32
One issue is the meaning of possession in the context
of a TPM. The legislation covers smart cards as secure
signature creation devices.33 However, the official
statement also mentions special components as secure
signature creation devices to be used in mainframe
architectures.34 Since the definition of a secure
signature creation device is not very specific,35 it is not
necessary for the secure signature creation device to be
portable, as provided for by the provisions of § 15(1)
SigVO. The aim of the regulation is to ensure the
signatory has the secure signature creation device in
their custody, and is capable of preventing unauthorized
access to the device. In the case of mobile devices, this
custody can be adduced by physically inspecting the
device. Unfortunately, it is more difficult to prove that
the signatory has sole access to the device and can
prevent unauthorized access. In this context, the TPM
could be situated in an external environment, and the
signatory could obtain access to this device remotely,
and protect it with the password. This fact would neither
fulfill the requirement of §§ 5(6) and 15(7) SigG nor the
protection purpose of § 15(1) SigVO. Therefore, the CSP
must verify whether the applicant of an electronic
signature has the secure signature creation device in
their custody and is capable of preventing unauthorized
access. To achieve these properties, it might be
necessary for an employee of the CSP to physically
attend the applicant’s premises to confirm possession.
The use of a password implies that the signatory has
control of the secure signature creation device. This
does not exclude the creation of signatures on remote
devices, if the signatory can prevent unauthorized
access to the signature creation device by protecting it
physically.
Conclusion
The Trusted Platform Module offers, from the
technological point of view, the possibility to use and
store personal certificates and their corresponding keys.
In the realm of the EU Directive, it can serve as a secure
signature creation device. In Germany, to create
qualified signatures with the TPM, the TPM must be
approved as a secure signature creation device
according to § 17(4) SigG. Furthermore, the TPM must
31 It should be noted that the protocol described in
this article only proves that the generated keys are
generated on a secure signature creation device,
and not whether the applicant is really the one
who initiates the protocol.
32 Alexander Roßnagel and Stefanie Fischer-Dieskau,
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW)  2006, pp
806 (11.07.2006).
33 S. z.B. Bundestags-Drucksache 14/4662, 21, 29, 30;
Official statement to SigVO, 27.
34 Official statement to SigVO, 27.
35 According to the provisions of § 2(10) SigG.
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be protected against unauthorized access and be in the
signatory’s direct possession and secured with an
additional method of proving possession. If the TPM is
to be used as a signature creation device, it is necessary
that the TPM implements the protocol set out in this
article, which enables a qualified certificate to be issued
to a specific TPM signing key. Based on the high
availability and low cost of a TPM, it can reduce the
costs involved in creating signatures and possibly act to
increase the use of secure signature creation devices.
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